to a fixed area within a state fairground is constitutional. The Court held that a rule requiring that the sale of goods, distribution of literature and solicitation of contributions 6 be from a fixed location, is a reasonable time, place and manner restriction of first amendmet activity. 7 The International Society for Krishna Consciousness (IS-KON) is a non-profit religious organization. ISKON members engage in a religious ritual called " Sankirtan," 8 which requires the members to go out into public places 9 to proselytize, solicit donations and distribute the Society's religious publications. The ISKON members claim that they should be permitted to perform Sankirtan throughout the open areas of the Minnesota State Fairgrounds.
The Minnesota State Fair is held each year for a twelve-day period in an enclosed 125 acre state fairground permanently located in St. Paul, Minnesota.
10 The Fair annually attracts 1,320,000 visitors, with an average daily attendance of 115,000.11 Because of the large crowds attending the Fair, the Minnesota State Fair Society is given authority 12 to enact rules which are necessary and proper to protect the health, safety and comfort 6. Proselytism, distribution of religious literature, sale of religious literature, and solicitation of donations are activities protected by the first amendment. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (solicitation "involve [s] a variety of speech interests--communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes-that are within the protection of the First Amendment"); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1943) (sale and distribution of religious literature is "an age-old form of missionary evangelism... occup [ying] the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits").
7. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981) .
8. The practice of Sankirtan has three principal objectives: spreading religious "truth" through sales and distribution of literature and other materials, seeking converts, and soliciting money. United States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 870 (M.D. Fla. 1979) . For background on Sankirtan, see generally, PRABHUPADA, PREACHING AS THE ESSENCE (1977) .
9. The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted "going out into public places" as meaning peripatetic conduct. International Soc'y for Kirshna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heifron, 299 N.W.2d 79, 83 n.7 (Minn. 1980) .
10. This permanent facility is comprised chiefly of permanent buildings, temporary structures, a race track, carnival rides, and parking lots. Approximately one-third of the total fairground acreage constitutes the area generally occupied by the persons who attend, participate in and work at the fair. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981) . The fair is authorized under MINN. STAT. § 37.15 (1980) . 11. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 643 (1981) .
12. MINN. STAT. § 37.16 (1980) . 14 This Rule requires that the sale of any written material, the solicitation of money and the distribution of all materials take place only at a rented booth. ISKON fied suit against numerous state officials, seeking a declaration that Rule 6.05 violated their rights under the first amendment, and an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of Rule 6.05 against ISKON and its members.
5
The trial court upheld the constitutionality of Rule 6.05. 16 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed; 7 although it recognized a valid state interest in maintaining crowd control, the court held that the state's interest can adequately be served by means less restrictive of first amendment rights.
18
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the state court decision was reversed.
19 Writing for the majority, Justice White, recognizing that activities protected by the first amendment may be subject to "reasonable time, place and manner restrictions,"
2 o identified the criteria necessary to find that a regulation imposes a constitutional time, place and manner restriction.
The first criterion was that the restriction "may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of the speech."
'2 1 The Court noted that Rule 6.05 applies equally to all persons or groups who wish to sell or exhibit products, solicit contributions 13. The Society is authorized to make: "all bylaws, ordinances, and rules, not inconsistent with law, which it may deem necessary or proper for the government of the fair grounds and all fairs to be held thereon, and for the protection, health, safety, and comfort of the public thereon ....
[T] he violation of a bylaw, rule, or ordinance promulgated by the society is a misdemeanor". In rejecting the Minnesota Supreme Court's view that the state's interest is insufficient to justify a restriction upon IS-KON's first amendment rights, Justice White emphasized that the justification for the Rule should not be measured by the disorder that would result from granting an exemption solely to IS-KON. Rather, the justification for the rule should be measured by the disorder which occurs if no group were required to rent a booth.
26
As to the third criterion, that there be no less restrictive means available to achieve the state objective, the majority rejected the Minnesota Supreme Court's view that the threat posed to the state's interest in crowd control could be avoided by less restrictive means. 27 The majority again directed its inquiry not only to the disorder that would be caused solely by ISKON members but to the disorder that could result if all organizations were exempted from the Rule. Justice White argued that it is "quite improbable that alternative means . . . would deal adequately with the problems posed by the much larger 22. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981 Justice Brennan wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Brennan thought the majority erred in failing to apply its analysis separately to the three types of first amendment activities restricted by Rule 6.05: distribution of literature, solicitation of funds and sale of literature.
30 Brennan would uphold Rule 6.05 as it applied to solicitation and sales activity 3 ' but invalidate the Rule as it applied to the distribution of literature. In finding Rule 6.05 unconstitutional as applied to the distribution of literature, Justice Brennan stated that the "state could have drafted a more narrowly-drawn restriction... without undermining its interest in maintaining crowd control on the fairgrounds.
'32 Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion concurring with Brennan, adding that the distribution of literature "may present even fewer crowd control problems than the oral proselytizing that the State already allows upon the fairgrounds. '33 Analysis of any case involving a restriction upon conduct protected by the first amendment must begin by realizing that such conduct, even though it is protected by the first amendment, still may be subject to some type of government regulation.3 Regulations of conduct which most often survive a constitutional challenge are those which restrict only the time, place or manner of first amendment activity.
3 5 A regulation which restricts the time, place or manner of first amendment activities may be imposed subject to a test of reasonableness. A 28. Heifron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 653-54 (1981 serves a significant governmental interest, 3 and is the least restrictive means available to achieve that significant governmental interest.
38
With respect to the limitation that the regulation must be non-content oriented, courts have struck down statutes where the primary objective is the prohibition of particular statements.
3 9 A state cannot enact a statute for the purpose of limit-36. When a law that regulates first amendment activity bases its regulation on the subject matter, it "slips from the neutrality of time, place and circumstances into a concern about content. 38. The availability of "less restrictive means" signifies that a governmental regulation has inhibited expression, belief, or association more than the Constitution allows. When a state has available a variety of equally effective means to a given end, it must choose the measure which least interferes with first amendment activities. For a summary of first amendment cases using the "least restrictive means" doctrine, 95-96 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting picketing except for labor unions held invalid because it is not content neutral).
Nevertheless, governmental regulations based on subject matter have been approved in narrow circumstances. In Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Government could prohibit partisan political speech on a military base even though civilian speakers had been allowed to lecture on other subjects. The necessity for excluding partisan speech was based upon the policy of "keeping official military activities.., wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind." Id. at 839. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) , the Court similarly concluded that a city transit system that rented space in its busses for commercial advertising did not have to accept partisan political advertising. The city's refusal to accept political advertising was based upon fears that partisan advertisements might jeopardize longterm commercial revenue, that commuters would be subjected to political propaganda, and that acceptance of particular political advertisements might lead to charges of favoritism. Id. at 302-04. These two cases are viewed as narrow exceptions to the general prohibition against subject mat-[Vol. 15:543 ing information or suppressing a particular viewpoint. 40 As the majority correctly concluded, Rule 6.05 is not subject to attack on the grounds that it is content oriented. 4 1 The rule does not distingush among applicants based on the content of their literature nor does it restrict the content of any literature sold from a booth.
Courts have also struck down statutes which give state officials unlimited discretion in granting or denying permits for access to public places. 42 Regulations which give state officials such discretion have the potential for becoming a means of limiting information or of suppressing a particular point of view.
43
Rule 6.05 is applied on a straightforward, first-come, first-served basis. Therefore, as Justice White noted, the Rule does not give state officials unconstitutional discretion to grant or deny space selectively."
The second limitation is that a reasonable time, place or manner restriction must serve a significant governmental interest. 45 Once the state has shown that a regulation furthers a sig- 42. "[Ain ordinance which ... makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official-as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official-is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms." Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969) , quoting Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958) . It is well-settled that a law subjecting the right of free expression in public places to the prior restraint of a license must be narrow, objective and provide definite standards for the granting of a permit. Id. See, e.g ' 4 9 Public facilities in which the intercommunication of ideas is a primary purpose for which the facility is created have been held to be forums ripe for first amendment activity.
50 Fairgrounds exist as a place for the exchange of views among the members of the public. 5 ' If a school, which has a clearly defined purpose independent of personal intercommunication among students, constitutes a public forum for first amendment purposes, 5 2 then it would seem that a public fairground is at least equally available for the exercise of protected activity. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 272 (7th Cir. 1978 ) (airport's public non-leased areas are appropriate forums for first amendment activity); Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (bus terminal concourse is a public forum which "resembles a street" and is "attended with noisy crowds and vehicles, some unrest and less than perfect order").
50. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (municipal theaters are "public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive activities"); Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (governmental meeting house is a public forum because of its purpose as a place for the exchange of views among members of the public). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrru-TONAL LAw, § 12.21 at 688-90 (1978).
51.
As one author has concluded about the nature of fairgrounds, "they have constituted an important, if not the sole, point of vivid personal contact with the larger world. As such they have been and still are a source of general information and social intercourse, no less than a means of serving some more clearly defined end or ends." W. NEELY, THE AGRICULTURAL FAIR, 156 (1935 ble with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time. 55 Applying Grayned, Justice White concludes that because of the nature of the fairgrounds, the need for crowd control is more pressing than it is in other traditional forums such as public streets. 56 In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not consider separately the three types of expressions which are restricted by the regulation, even though each activity has a different impact upon the normal activity of the fairgrounds. Thus, some of the restrictions constitute reasonable time, place and manner regulations, while others do not.
Sales and solicitation activities are basically incompatible with the normal activity of the open areas of the fairgrounds because they restrict the free flow and orderly movement of the crowd.
57 Sales and solicitation activities involve acts of exchanging articles for money, fumbling for and dropping money, and making change.
5 8 These activities serve to aggravate an already existing crowd control problem. Therefore, as applied to sales and solicitation activities, Rule 6.05 serves a significant governmental interest by preserving order and safety within the open areas of the fairgrounds.
Conversely, the distribution of literature is not incompatible with the normal activities of the fairgrounds. The distribution of literature has no greater impact on the orderly flow of the crowd than does the act of oral proselytism, which is allowed within the fairgrounds. The distribution of religious literature is a form of proselytism. It communicates religious beliefs by means of written words rather than oral communication. 59 In fact, the distribution of literature may take less time than oral proselytism. Thus, as the concurring opinion points out, "literature distribution may present even fewer crowd control problems than the 55. Id. at 116. See Stone, Fora Americana: Speech In Public Places, 1974 SuP. CT. RE V. 233, 251-52. 56. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981) .
57. The crowd at the fairgrounds is concentrated into about one-third of the 125-acre fairground. Given the large number of fairgoers who annually attend the fair, there is confusion and congestion throughout the lanes of pedestrian traffic. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79, 87 (Minn. 1980) . 58. For a discussion of the disruption caused by sales and solicitation activities at a fairground, see International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1979) .
59. Distribution of literature is "an age-old form of missionary evangelism-as old as the history of printing presses,. .. a potent force in various religious movements down through the years." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (footnotes omitted).
oral proselytizing that the state already allows. '60 The third limitation is that a reasonable time, place and manner restriction be the least restrictive form of regulation which adequately protects the governmental interest at stake.
61
The majority in Heffron concluded that Rule 6.05 is the least restrictive means available to achieve the state's legitimate interest in maintaining the safe and orderly flow of the crowd.
62
Again, the Court reached this conclusion without separately analyzing the three different activities restricted by the Rule. The Court treated sales, solicitation and distribution as a single activity. As noted above, however, these activities affect the state's interest differently.
63
Sales and solicitation have a greater impact on the safe and orderly flow of the crowd at the fairgrounds than the distribution of literature. Thus, as Rule 6.05 applies to sales and solicitation activities, it is the least restrictive means to achieve a legitimate state interest in maintaining the safe and orderly flow of the crowd. When Rule 6.05 is applied to distribution of literature, a different result is reached since a less restrictive, more narrowly drawn regulation could have been drafted.
A state seeking to restrict first amendment activities must 60. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 665 (1981) (emphasis added).
61. It has long been held that even a government regulation that is completely content-neutral, and serves a legitimate governmental interest which is totally unrelated to the suppression of speech, may be invalid if the governmental purpose can be achieved by less restrictive means.
The 515-16 (1939) .
For a statute to be the least restrictive means to achieve a significant governmental interest, the government must show that sufficient alternative forums exist so that the restricted party will still be able to reach his audience. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972) do so by narrowly drawn regulations. 64 Broad, prophylactic rules which restrict first amendment activities are invalid.
65 As Rule 6.05 applies to distribution of literature, it is not narrowly drawn. Courts considering broad preclusive rules in similar circumstances have rejected state justifications based upon speculative and undifferentiated fears of disturbances.
6 6 The distribution of literature does not cause the crowd control problems inherent in sales or solicitation activities; Minnesota's Rule is based on a speculative fear of disorder. A valid state restriction should have prevented distribution from areas too close to entrances or exits, or specifically prohibited obstruction of the free passage of pedestrians, or limited the total number of distributors allowed to move about each day.
67 Because Rule 6.05 could have been more narrowly drawn as applied to the distributors of literature, the Court erred in not invalidating that portion of the Rule.
Heffron recognized that a state may reasonably regulate the time, place or manner of first amendment conduct within a fairground. The outcome of Heffron points the way to an acceptable balance of the rights of fairgoers with those of Krishna-type so-64. The regulation must be narrowly drawn to achieve the government's interest while not imposing a heavy burden upon the individual. Compare Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (statute which limits the use of sound trucks on public streets is narrowly drawn) and Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972) (regulation against loud noise close to a school is narrowly drawn to further the state's interest in maintaining order) with Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (ban on door-to-door distribution and street distribution of circulars too broad to achieve the state's interest).
65. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). "[Village may serve its legitimate interests, but it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve these interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 837. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) . "Broad prophylatic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone. . . ." Id. at 438.
66.
Since distribution of literature does not pose the crowd control problems that solicitation and sales activities do, see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text, the fear of disorder is speculative. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). State sought to justify a restriction on the wearing of armbands at school because this activity may cause disorder. The court held the regulation invalid, stating, "in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Id. at 508. 53, 57 (1979) . The decision in Heffron comes at a time when many state officials are trying to confine the activities of Krishna-type groups in such forums as airports, bus terminals, and railroad stations.
6 8 These forums are more limited and enclosed than fairgrounds. The need to protect the safe and orderly movement of the crowd may be more compelling in these forums than in fairgrounds. In light of the Heffron decision, state officials will
